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Abstract 
 
Money laundering is one of the largest economic problems of the 21st century with huge social 
implications and effects. It enables the richest and most powerful in society to take advantage 
of globalisation and differences across countries. It is only for less well-off money laundering 
regulations in the UK are stringent and enforced. Money laundering is not a ‘victimless crime’. 
The individual(s) or the country (and inhabitants) from which the money is stolen are, by 
definition, the victims/losers, whilst the money is used in the recipient country to support the 
criminal’s lifestyle or other activities such as drug importation, child sexual exploitation, 
human trafficking and terrorism and so on, alternatively, invested in property until a 
profitable opportunity arises. 
 
This paper examines the problem both generally and the UK in particular. It describes the 
main forms and types of money laundering and the devices used. This is followed by sections 
on its effects on an economy and contains an empirical study of this as it affects London 
property prices, the actions taken by UK regulators against money launderers, their advisers 
and agents. The final section discusses some recent initiates and recommendations as to what 
can and should be done. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Economic and social effects of money laundering: the UK case   
 
 
1. Introduction 
Money laundering is one of the largest economic problems of the 21st century with huge social 
implications and effects. Not only does it add to inequality by assisting criminals to steal, 
assisted by lawyers and accountants who devise the schemes yet appear to have no ethical 
restraints, it enables the richest and most powerful in society to take advantage of 
globalisation and differences across countries. It is only for less well-off money laundering 
regulations in the UK are stringent and enforced. 
  
Money laundering is not a ‘victimless crime’. In many instances, this is obvious. In the case of 
an international transaction, the individual(s) or the country (and inhabitants) from which the 
money is stolen are, by definition, the victims/losers, whilst the money is used in the recipient 
country to support the criminal’s lifestyle or other activities such as drug importation, child 
sexual exploitation, human trafficking and terrorism and so on, alternatively, invested in 
property until a profitable opportunity arises. 
 
The best international estimate of money laundered globally is £1.25 trillion (US$1.6 trillion) 
in 2009 which is equivalent to 2.7% of global GDP (HM Treasury and Home Office, 2015). The 
US is the top origin of laundered money (second and third are Italy and Russia) and the top 
destination (second and third are the Cayman Islands and Russia) (Unger, 2007, p. 80). Unger 
(p. 191-2) claims that the total contribution of small countries to total money laundering is 
small. Her main finding is that large industrialised OECD economies are the main conduits 
notably in the US where the regulation of shell companies fell short of regulatory safeguards 
necessary to deter money laundering (US GAO 2006: 41-42). She also cited evidence (although 
old) that the City of London was a key centre for money laundering and terrorist financing. In 
contrast, Jersey and the Isle of Man are found to be models of good corporate regulation that 
would be useful in countering money laundering (US GAO 2006: 41-42). 
 
  
 
 
 
In the UK, the National Crime Agency (‘NCA’) has estimated that the amount of money 
laundered in the UK is around £150bn each year.i It has also been estimated that £4.4bn of 
UK property has been bought with suspicious wealth, with more than a fifth purchased by 
Russians. During the 18 months to March 2017, £56m of cash was blocked from being 
transferred to criminals. 
 
It is also believed that overseas companies are used as vehicles to invest funds in UK property 
from criminal or illegitimate activities in the UK and overseas. The Department of Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy has estimated that over £135m of UK property owned by 
overseas companies is currently the subject of a criminal investigation but this, of course, 
represents a small proportion of the UK property owned by offshore companies. In the 
majority of cases, the use of an offshore entity to hold property may not have any criminal 
motivation other than a desire for secrecy. Overseas companies have been used legitimately 
for decades as a tax as a tax avoidance device. 
 
Whilst the freedom of movement of funds is a necessary condition for efficient resource 
allocation leading to economic efficiency and prosperity, it has pitfalls. One of these is the 
encouragement of money laundering effectively involving the transfer of money (‘theft’) from 
one country (the ‘victim’) to another with and many socially undesirable effects. Whilst at first 
glance the transfer of money to the receiving country provides it with economic benefits, it 
swamps it with unneeded funds leading to inflation and other socially undesirable effects. A 
good example of this is the flow of money from Russia to the UK and in particular London 
where much of this money is invested in property affecting the housing market in both 
London and its hinterland. Real estate prices in London increased 50% from 2007 to 2016. It 
is also well known that London house prices have increased over many years relative to 
elsewhere in the UK. It is often asserted that this is not just because of higher average earnings 
in London but because it has become a safe haven for corrupt capital stolen from around the 
world, facilitated by the laws which allow UK property to be owned by secret offshore 
companies (TI, 2015).  
 
  
 
 
 
It is the purpose of this paper to briefly examine these issues using publicly available 
information. The next section examines the problem both generally and the UK in particular. 
it is followed by a brief description of the forms and types of money laundering and the 
devices used. This is followed by sections on its effects on an economy, an empirical study of 
this as it affects London property prices, and actions taken by UK regulators against money 
launderers, their advisers and agents. The final section discusses some recent initiates and 
recommendations as to what can and should be done. 
 
2. The Problem of Countering Money Laundering: The UK legislation and regulation.  
Money laundering is a process whose objective is to disguise the existence, nature, source, 
control, beneficial ownership, location and disposition of property derived from criminal 
activity or fraudulent behaviour. There are many reasons why an individual may wish to 
launder money ranging from a divorcee hiding money from an ex-spouse through to tax 
evasion, the legitimisation of the proceeds of sale of drugs, the funding of terrorists, domestic 
flight and evading government monetary controls and regulations. The difference between 
tax avoidance and evasion is legality. Tax evasion is the illegal act of not paying taxes: for 
example, by not reporting income, falsifying expenses and tax returns or by devising schemes 
for not paying what is owed. Tax avoidance is simply arranging one’s financial affairs in order 
to minimise tax payable. Whilst it may be unethical, it is not illegal. Moving money simply to 
avoid tax or conceal ownership is not unlawful and does not constitute money laundering.ii It 
only becomes unlawful if the funds are the proceeds of crime.iii 
 
Laws against money laundering were created in the US to use against organized crime during 
Prohibition in the 1930s.  In the 1980s, the war on drugs in the US and elsewhere led 
governments again to turn to money-laundering rules in an attempt to seize their proceeds 
of sale in order to catch and deter the organizers and individuals involved.  The 9/11 attacks 
in the US in 2001 led to a new emphasis on money laundering laws to combat terrorism 
financing throughout the world: starting in 2002 with the Patriot Act in the US, the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002 (‘PoCA’) in the UK and similar legislation elsewhere.  
PoCA facilitated the confiscation of money by law enforcement agencies without having to 
prove guilt. The individual is required to prove that the sources of funds are legitimate.  PoCA 
  
 
 
 
created a single set of money laundering offences applicable to the proceeds of all crimes, i.e. 
it was obtained through unlawful conduct whether in the UK or elsewhere (Section 241). 
Money laundering offences assume that a criminal offence has occurred in order to generate 
the criminal property that is being laundered (a ‘predicate offence’). However, it must be 
proved that, at the time of the offence, the defendant knew or suspected that the property 
was criminal property. Also, under Section 327, a person commits an offence if he/she 
conceals, disguises, converts, transfers or removes criminal property from the UK. Under 
Section 328 a person commits an offence if he/she enters into an arrangement which he/she 
knows or suspects facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by 
or on behalf of another person. PoCA treats all forms of ‘acquisitive criminal behaviour’ as 
proceeds of crime. So, a simple non-payment of tax, an organised bank robbery, or even share 
ramping would all be viewed in the same way: if the crime results in a benefit or permits the 
criminal to avoid paying something he/she is obliged to pay, this would be classed as the 
proceeds of crime. 
 
In the UK, as in many other countries, the requirement of a financial institution to ‘know your 
customer’ together with Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) or Suspicious Transaction Reports 
(STR) form the basis of the regulatory process in practice. A SAR or STR is required to be made 
by financial institutions and other professionals such as solicitors, accountants and estate 
agents about suspicious or potentially suspicious activity to the NCA’s Financial Intelligence 
Unit (UKFIU). The criteria used to define suspicion vary from country to country, but generally 
it is that the transaction does not make sense to the financial institution, is unusual for the 
client, or it appears to be done to hide or obfuscate another transaction. The UKFIU analyses 
the reports and then sends them to the appropriate organisations for investigation. 
 
One of the most powerful tools available to UK regulators is the ‘skilled person’ report. Under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, S166 as amended by the 2012 Finance Act, the 
FCA may obtain a view from a third party (the ‘skilled person’) about aspects of a regulated 
firm's activities.iv Either the regulated firm chooses the skilled person firm for FCA approval 
or, if not, the FCA decides. A similarly effective instrument in the US is Section 311 of the USA 
Patriot Act, 2001, which empowers the US Treasury Department to designate foreign 
  
 
 
 
financial institutions, jurisdictions, or entities as ‘of primary money laundering concern’. Such 
a designation is intended to highlight to regulators suspicious patterns of activity without 
having to prove any single transaction is illegal. It also forces financial institutions to avoid 
the entity, effectively prohibiting the entity from being involved in global finance.v 
 
PoCA was amended by the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 following the EU’s Third 
Money Laundering Directive, 2005. It was further amended by the Criminal Finances Act 2017 
which introduced a new corporate criminal offence of failing to prevent tax evasion and 
provided additional tools to investigate suspected money laundering and terrorist financing. 
The 2017 Act also introduced  ‘Unexplained Wealth Orders’, in which professionals such as  
estate agents are required to report to regulators investments made by individuals who did 
not appear to have legitimate means to afford them or could not explain the source of their 
money. Law enforcement are then able to seize the assets.  
 
The 2007 regulations were revised by the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer 
of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (the ‘Money Laundering Regulations 
2017’) and now apply to banks, building societies and other firms undertaking certain financial 
activities including all gambling providers rather than simply holders of a casino operating 
licence required under the 2007 regulations. The 2017 regulations require them to apply risk-
based customer due diligence measures and take more stringent measures to prevent their 
services from being used for money laundering or terrorist financing. The 2017 regulations 
introduced a number of other significant changes, notably relating to politically exposed 
persons (PEP). The parts of the 2007 regulations which applied only to foreign PEPs now also 
apply to local PEPs. In practice, this means increasing due diligence requirements for a 
broader range of individuals who have been trusted with prominent public functions both in 
the UK and overseas. 
 
The 2017 regulations empower the UK Government to target individuals accused of ‘gross 
human rights violations and seize their UK assets in line with the US approach under the US 
Magnitsky Act. Finally, the 2017 regulations introduced a new criminal offence relating to any 
individual who recklessly makes a statement in the context of money laundering which is false 
  
 
 
 
or misleading. The most recent change is the passing of the Sanctions and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act, 2018 whose aim was to provide a legal framework to allow the UK to impose 
and implement its own sanctions regime when the UK leaves the EU and goes beyond the 
current EU sanctions regime. 
 
3. The forms and types of money laundering and the devices used. 
The money laundering process involves three stages:  
 
(1) The placement of funds into the financial system unnoticed. This may take many forms 
ranging from a large single deposit to a series of smaller amounts. The process of depositing 
or withdrawing a larger sum by means of a number of smaller amounts is known as ‘smurfing’. 
EC/UK money laundering legislation has concentrated its efforts on this first stage attempting 
to prevent the proceeds of criminal behaviour leaving the system. 
 
‘Structuring’ or ‘Smurfing’ involves breaking up the receipt of a large amount of money into 
smaller transactions below the reporting threshold (10,000 euros or US dollars, the reporting 
threshold for banks) then used to purchase money orders or other instruments to avoid 
detection or suspicion. Often, these smaller sums can then be deposited in various banks by 
different people (‘smurfs’) effectively ‘placing.vi However, it is possible to structure without 
the use of any smurfs at all. 
 
(2) Layering which involves the creation of apparently legitimate transactions. This involves 
the transfer of funds across many bank accounts and jurisdictions in order to frustrate 
attempts at tracing the original funds 
 
(3) Integration, involving bringing the money back into the financial system (again, through 
smurfing if necessary) with the appearance that it came from a legitimate source either the 
result of a legitimate transaction or that the assets already belonged to the beneficial owner. 
These transactions may be difficult to detect deter as they are designed to appear normal. 
 
  
 
 
 
There are many ways by which money may be laundered.  The following are some of the most 
popular designed to ensure that transactions are hidden: 
 
1. ‘Bulk cash’, the smuggling by the money launderer him/herself or a courier. This involves 
literally smuggling cash into another country and depositing it there in a bank that provides 
client secrecy or converting it directly into cheques or money orders. As the courier has no 
apparent connection with the true owner of the funds, the criminal retains his anonymity.vii 
  
2. ‘Bank capture’, the use of a bank that is owned by money launderers or criminals 
themselves, who are then able to move funds through the bank without fear of investigation. 
The classic example in the UK is the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (‘BCCI’). BCCI 
was formed in 1972 and registered in Luxembourg with head offices in Karachi and London. 
At its peak, BCCI had over 400 branches in 78 countries and assets over US$20bn, making it 
the seventh largest private bank in the world. However, in the 1980s, due to regulators’ 
suspicions it was investigated and found to be involved in massive money laundering and 
other financial crimes, and had illegally gained the controlling interest in a large US bank. In 
1991 it was raised by bank regulators in seven countries and closed down. US and UK 
Investigators stated that BCCI had been ‘set up deliberately to avoid centralized regulatory 
review …. to commit fraud on a massive scale, and to avoid detection’.viii 
 
3. The use of a Money Services Business (MSB), an organisation that transfers money, cashes 
cheques or converts currencies. A corrupt MSB would arrange for money to be paid into UK 
bank accounts which it would then wire abroad, typically, to locations in the Far East or Middle 
East using falsified business records and forged documents to cover its tracks. See for example 
the case of  
Touma Foreign Exchange Ltd which was fined £7.8.ix  
 
4. The use of prepaid cards, or stored value cards (SVC) (https://www.vantiv.com/vantage-
point/smarter-payments/stored-value-cards).  
 
  
 
 
 
5. The use of unregulated, hidden and informal banking facilitiesx such as cybercurrencyxi and 
other exchanges such as the black market Peso Exchangexii Hawala.xiii 
 
6. The use of a legitimate cash-based business, ‘hiding In plain sight’ Perhaps the simplest is 
filtering the laundered funds through an apparently legitimate business, preferably cash-
based. Businesses that handle large amounts of cash sales have always been popular for 
money laundering, such as bars, taxi firms, recycling firms, restaurants, and nightclubs. This 
may be done by recording the laundered money as business income and accompanying this 
with payments disguised by fictitious invoices purporting to be necessary business expenses. 
Invoices may also be altered to show a higher or lower amount in order to disguise the 
movement of money If the firm has no auditors, there are no checks to identify these receipts 
as business sales. For example, in the case of a restaurant this would involve the purchase of 
fictitious meals. Alternatively, rather than attempting to disguise money as normal business 
revenue, the funds may simply be deposited into the bank account of the business as a capital 
investment.  
 
7. The use of professionals, such as solicitors, accountants, and stock brokers, to launder the 
money.xiv Through investments, trust accounts, fund transfers, and tax avoidance schemes, 
they may manipulate the financial, commercial, and legal systems to conceal the origin and 
ownership of assets.  Another way to use an innocent professional is to engage him/her in a 
financial scheme, pay fees up-front, and then cancel the transaction and ask for the return of 
fees but in a different name of form. A variation of this is to invent a claim or enter into sham 
litigation. For example, a director appears to dismisses an employee, who then sues and the 
company agrees to settle out of court.  
 
8. The use of educational institutions such as schools, colleges and universities where money 
is transferred by criminals to fund pupils’ and students’ living expenses and fees. The problem 
of fictitious college and university students and their courses in the UK has been well 
documented. However, these schemes also extend to schools which may not be expected to 
know which are legitimate bank accounts even though some of their pupils come from parts 
of the world with high levels of corruption.xv 
  
 
 
 
 
9. Casino gambling which involves an individual going into a casino with the illegally obtained 
money. The individual purchases chips with the cash, plays for a while, then cashes out the 
chips, and claims the money as gambling winnings.xvi 
 
10. The use of gambling such as online gamingxvii or horse racing.xviii Money launderers, say 
from the illegal sale of drugs, often use betting to help disguise their dealing. For example, 
the use of fixed odds betting terminals (FOBTs). Here, the launderer having received the 
proceeds of crime in cash may attempt to ‘cleanse’ it by betting through these machines or 
doing the same online. The ‘winnings’ will either be taken in cash or credited to the 
launderer’s account. FOBTs pay out between 85% and 95% so a money launderer may employ 
‘smurfs’ to gamble in this way. The proceeds from winning would then appear to be legitimate 
as receipts may be obtained if done online or if the customer has an account with the betting 
company it will appear on his/her statement of account. It is possible that this may be hidden 
from investigators if the identities of the smurfs is hidden. 
 
A similar method would be to bet by what is known as ‘arbitrage betting’ (or ‘arbing’). This 
involves betting on all the possible outcomes of a competition. For example, the outcome of 
a football or tennis match, a car race or even a horse race when there are relatively few 
runners. Again, a money launderer would probably employ smurfs to bet in this way. Although 
he/she may make a net loss, this would be an acceptable cost of legitimisation.xix (As betting 
companies dislike ‘arbing’, they may ban individuals from betting with them if they suspect a 
person is a smurf.)xx 
. 
11. Cuckoo smurfing. This involves the payment of money into accounts of unsuspecting 
individuals. The term is derived from the way a cuckoo will lay its eggs in the nests of other 
species of birds. The process involves two or more concurrent transactions: a legitimate 
payment by an unwitting customer to a legitimate supplier (probably in a different country) 
and the need for a payment of a similar sum by a money launderer and a complicit bank. See 
Figure 1. Say the legitimate businesses are in the UK and USA where a UK buyer wants to pay 
a US supplier and the money launderers are in the same two countries and a (probably 
  
 
 
 
complicit) international bank has branches there. In which case, the UK buyer pays the money 
owed to the bank in the UK which transfers the money not to the US supplier (as the innocent 
supplier and buyer think) but to the UK money launderer. At the same time, the US money 
launderer pays an equivalent of money into the US bank which transfers that money to the 
US supplier. The effect is that the UK buyer has paid the US supplier but the money has not 
been transferred to the US; it has been used by the bank in the UK to pay the UK money 
launderer and the US supplier has received a similar sum from the US bank being the money 
paid to it by the US money launderer.  
 
Figure 1 
Cuckoo smurfing 
 
 
 
 
12. Real estate laundering, when someone purchases it with money obtained illegally or 
wishes to move money abroad through the purchase of property abroad but wants to evade 
paying tax in that country. In which case, the property will then be sold and the money 
deposited in bank accounts in that country or then used to buy property in another country. 
  
 
 
 
This will usually involve the use of shell companies and some of these schemes are explained 
below. 
 
13. The use of shell companies (analogous to an empty shell), corporate entities that do not 
trade and have no significant assets. They are not necessarily illegal - one may be needed to 
set up a new legitimate business - but they are often used unlawfully to disguise or hide the 
ownership of money or other assets from regulators and/or the public. xxi They are not limited 
to limited liability companies but may be for example limited liability partnerships, trusts or 
foundations.xxii 
 
Often the names of nominee individuals as shareholders and directors are used to hide the 
identities of the real owners. A nominee has no real power and merely signs forms and 
documents for a fee as instructed by the real owner. Shell companies may be registered in a 
tax haven, where the nominee will usually be a resident. These services are available from 
firms online.xxiii Often large numbers of shell companies are registered at the same address. 
For example, the indictment accusing Donald Trump's former campaign chairman Paul 
Manafort of a money laundering scheme traced shell companies involved to 2 Woodberry 
Grove N12 0DR, a small house in north London at which more than 25,802 companies had 
been registered by a company services agent.xxiv  
 
Another recent UK example involves revelations concern the business practices and clients of 
the company service provider, Formations House. OCCRP have shown how Formations House 
set up 400,000 companies around the world since 2001, ‘many for those with dubious pasts 
and assets to hide’ including ‘929 UK shell companies used in 89 corruption and money 
laundering cases, amounting to around £137bn globally’.xxv 
 
Various law firms have been found to not only offer nominee services but also devise and 
arrange money laundering and tax evasion schemes involving regulatory and tax havens such 
as The British Virgin Isles (BVI) and Panama where it is almost impossible to know the identity 
of the real owners of the companies and properties. For example, in Spain, a Mallorca law 
firm, Buffet Feliu, set up corporate structures mainly in Panama to conceal their ownership 
  
 
 
 
and defraud the Spanish Government of taxes. The schemes involved the laundering millions 
of euros derived from drug trafficking, fraud and tax evasion and invested in Spanish property 
avoiding its taxes on the transfer of property and then transferred abroad. Buffet Feliu made 
the necessary arrangements and did the paperwork often involving nominees.  
 
The investigation known as ‘Operation Lightning’ (‘Operacion Relampago’) began in 2005 and 
finished in 2016 examined 816 companies involving €307m. Of these companies, 252 were 
non-resident and 161 were in offshore tax havens. It was also found that between 1997 and 
2006 Buffet Feliu had channelled more than €482m to offshore tax and regulatory havens. 
Operation Lightning’ resulted in the sentencing to jail of a partner in Buffet Feliu and a British 
businessman, Peter Brian Bradley, and the fining of individuals whose companies were found 
to be involved in money laundering schemes.xxvi ‘Operation White Whale’ (‘Ballena Blanca’) 
was Spain’s largest money laundering investigation involving  around 1,000 companies 
formed to invest over €250m derived from criminal activities of foreign mafia organisations 
involved in prostitution, drug trafficking, and luxury car theft, laundered through the 
purchase of Spanish property and then transferred to offshore bank accounts in Gibraltar 
and the Channel Islands. Again, a recognized law firm, Del Valle law firm in Marbella, 
executed the transactions.xxvii 
 
Little is known about the details of the money laundering schemes and the identities of the 
clients involved. However, in two other famous cases the full scale of the law firms’ 
operations, schemes and individuals are known due to the release of documents by 
whistleblowers. The first involved the leak of documents and correspondence (in total 11.5 
million files and known as the "Panama Papers") in 2015 directly from a database at Mossack 
Fonseca, at that time, the world’s fourth largest offshore law firm based in Panama. These 
documents have been examined by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists 
(ICIJ) and the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). Their findings have 
provided details and insights into how the rich and powerful are able to exploit secret offshore 
tax regimes in a variety of ways and soon led to the closure of the firm because of the 
reputational impact.  
  
 
 
 
 
The  second case occurred in November 2017 is, what is known as, the ‘Paradise Papers’, 13.4 
million confidential electronic documents relating to offshore investments that were leaked 
to and examined by ICIJ. The documents originate from the legal firm Appleby which had 
offices in offshore locations including Bermuda, the BVI,  and  the financial centres of Hong 
Kong and Shanghai, together with the corporate services providers Estera and Asiaciti Trust, 
and business registries in 19 tax jurisdictions. The incriminating documents contain the names 
of more than 120,000 people and companies including Prince Charles and Queen Elizabeth II, 
President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross.   
 
In both cases, the information released resulted in scandal, litigation, and loss of position for 
some of the individuals named, (some of these are discussed later) as well as litigation against 
the media and journalists who published the papers. Also, more than $1.2 billion in back-taxes 
and penalties has been publicly collected by governments around the world after the 2016 
investigation.xxviii 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
‘The Russian Laundromat’ 
 
 
 
Probably the most astonishing revelation was in 2014 of a scheme devised by organized 
criminals and corrupt politicians to move $20.8bn of dirty funds out of Russia. Between 2010 
and 2014, at least $20.8bn was laundered out of Russia, channelled into banks in Moldova 
and Latvia, and spread from there into 96 countries across the world.  The OCCRP has called 
it “the Russian Laundromat.” (https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/the-russian-
laundromat-exposed/). 21 shell companies with hidden owners were set up in the UK, Cyprus 
and New Zealand. A company would then create a fake ‘loan’ to another company, and a 
Russian firm would guarantee the loan. The shell companies would then default on the ‘loan’ 
and a corrupt Moldovan judge would ‘authenticate’ it, ordering the Russian debtor to make 
the repayment into a Moldovan court bank account. The money would usually go first to 
Trasta Komercbanka in Latvia and then be transferred to various banks abroad ending up in 
accounts in large global banks including 17 British banks of the largest of which was HSBC 
  
 
 
 
which received $545 million. The FCA stated in early 2017 that it was investigating but as yet 
they are not completed. 
 
The US experience provides an interesting insight into what should and can be done. Federal 
investigations continue to reveal corrupt politicians, drug traffickers and other criminals using 
shell companies to purchase luxury real estate with cash through shell companies. Whilst they 
do not by themselves indicate illegal or improper activity, these transactions mean buyers can 
hide their finances and identities and avoid legal scrutiny.  They have become more common 
in recent years in luxury home sales across the United States, notably buildings owned by 
Donald Trump, where developers have no obligation to scrutinize their purchasers or their 
funding sources. Since the 1980s, more than 1,300 Trump condominiums (one fifth of his sales) 
were bought by unidentified shell companies instead of people and the deals were completed 
without a mortgage, records of Trump's property deals show.xxix It is also argued that these 
property deals enable money launderers to bring cash into the US and the UK. For example, pay 
for a property in excess of its true worth, then receive a refund from the seller. 
 
It is difficult not to conclude from this discussion of the use of shell companies, offshore tax 
and regulatory havens that the individuals are attempting to hide or obfuscate their 
transactions and ask what are they hiding? Layers of corporate structure make it hard for 
investigators, tax officials and others to find the source of the money in these transactions, 
whether taxes are being avoided or evaded, or who the individuals are. Why are nominees 
used? Truly legitimate, transparent companies would not need to act in this way. 
Nevertheless, the secrecy available to shell companies could easily be removed. As Szubin 
(2016) in the US says ’Congress could close this loophole by passing a simple, two-page law 
requiring the beneficial owner of a company to be identified whenever a U.S. company is 
formed’. 
 
14. ‘Mirror trading’. Here, an individual or company opens up a trading account with a bank 
and deposits funds to purchase shares on an exchange in that country. An account is also 
opened by a counterparty in the country to which the money launderer wishes to move the 
money. Say, the launderer wishes to transfer money from Country A to Country B. The 
  
 
 
 
launderer would deposit the funds with the bank in country A asking it to buy shares in a stock 
on the exchange in that country. At the same time, it would ask the bank in country B to sell 
the same number of shares at the same price.xxx See Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 
‘Mirror trading’ 
 
 
Obviously, these transactions require a bank’s complicity for them to be carried out. In 
January 2017, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) announced it had 
found Deutsche Bank and some of its senior managers responsible for neglecting to detect, 
intercept and investigate a long-running mirror-trading scheme the bank had facilitated. This 
involved Deutsche Bank’s Moscow, New York and London branches in which between 2011 
and 2014 various wealthy Russians had been allowed to move $10bn out of Russia mainly into 
the UK. Each trade was between $2m and $3 million (DFS, 2017). Companies that were clients 
of the Moscow branch requested its equity section to purchase certain Russian stocks. These 
would be paid for in roubles. Through Deutsche Bank’s London branch, related counterparties 
  
 
 
 
would then sell the identical Russian stocks in US dollars. The counterparties involved were 
linked by common beneficial owners, management or agents to the Russian company. The 
trades were approved by Deutsche Bank. 
 
4. The effects of money laundering on an economy 
Unger (2007, p 110-3) has surveyed the literature at the time and lists the effects as follows:  
 
Short–term effects 
1. Losses to the victims and gains to the perpetrators. Victims are likely to use the money 
differently to perpetrators. Victim’s wealth and income are adversely affected, such as their 
disposable income and purchases of essentials, whilst the perpetrator’s wealth and income 
will be increased affecting their ability to purchase luxury items and assets that enable them 
to conceal illicit money.  
 
These affect the goods, services and financial markets. Not only are the consumption, output, 
supply and demand of goods and services affected but these are likely to lead to price 
increases and unfair competition. Other effects involve savings and investment, imports and 
exports, income and employment, revenues for the public sector (e.g. local and national 
taxation) exchange and interest rates. These, in turn, have secondary effects such as the 
volatility of interest and exchange rates, the availability of credit to nationals and increased 
capital flows. 
 
Long-term effects on the countries involved 
Not only may these have both positive and negative effects on countries’ growth rates, other 
effects may include changes in foreign direct investment potentially undermining foreign 
policy goals, increased risks in their financial sectors notably liquidity and corporate 
profitability. Other secondary effects of illegal business include the undermining of political 
institutions, the contamination of legal business, the reputation of the financial sector which 
in turn will increase in the likelihood of corruption, bribery, other financial crimes and the 
likelihood of terrorism. 
 
  
 
 
 
The next section examines these effects. 
 
a. Russia 
Money laundering had an impact on the rouble from 2011 onwards, and possibly earlier. A 
significant amount of it flowed to the UK, affecting the GB pound. See Figure 4 which shows 
the price of the rouble relative to the UK pound fell below 0.2 (i.e. it was worth 20 pence) in 
June 2012 and below 0.1 in July 2015, although it recovered to just over .01 in March 2016. It 
is currently around .013 (July 2019). 
 
Figure 4 
 
Source: https://www.exchangerates.org.uk/RUB-GBP-spot-exchange-rates-history-
2018.html 
 
In an attempt to keep Russian money at home and prevent it flowing abroad and protect the 
declining rouble exchange rate from further damaging the Russian economy, President Putin 
declared the illegality of ‘offshorization’. The Federal Law No 376-FZ dated 24 November 2014 
‘Concerning the Introduction of Amendments to Parts One and Two of the Tax Code of the 
Russian Federation (Regarding the Taxation of the Profit of Controlled Foreign Companies and 
the Income of Foreign Organizations)’ came into force in January 2015. The new Law 
introduced significant changes to the rules governing the reporting and taxation of interests 
of Russian tax residents resulting in the taxing of profits made by are known as ‘controlled 
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foreign companies’ (Yiolitis et al,2004). As a result, Russian billionaires attempted to hide their 
efforts (Caesar, 2017a, 2017b, Chan, 2017).  
 
The impact of the outflow of Russian money is illustrated by the rise and fall of Rublyovka, an 
area just outside Moscow. In the early 2000s it was by far the most prestigious place to live 
in Russia and one of the richest city suburbs in the world, providing the wealthiest Russians 
an appropriate address. Articles about Rublyovka around that time describe it as composed 
of magnificent buildings and residences and referred to as the Russian equivalent of Beverly 
Hills (http://www.home-designing.com/2011/06/rublevka-where-russias-super-elite-live). (I 
actually visited it around 2005 and found it was splendidly sumptuous). In 2008 Forbes 
included one of its mansions in the top five most expensive homes in the world 
(https://www.myguidemoscow.com/regionalinfo/rublevka). However, at some point the 
wealthy inhabitants of Rublyovka decided to leave and/or move their money elsewhere, in 
many cases to London. Salomatin (2015) writes  
‘Less than a decade ago, Rublyovka was one of the hottest suburbs in the world, with an 
influx of billionaire residents to live with the likes of Vladimir Putin and Roman Abramovich. 
Typical of the area was the ultra-high-end mall, Barvikha Luxury Village, opened in 2005. 
By 2011, however, the neighbourhood was emptying out, with one third of the houses 
either vacant or on the market and demand low. Many oligarchs were reportedly moving 
to the West, and it didn't help that Russia's economy was teetering from crisis to crisis. 
Now with money pouring out of the country at an astounding rate and oil prices painfully low, 
things are only getting worse.’ (https://www.businessinsider.com/rublyovka-the-richest-
neighborhood-in-moscow-2015-6?r=US&IR=T) 
Salomatin also provides photographs in his article which show the deterioration in the 
neighbourhood, abandoned construction sites, random piles of rubbish and fences falling over. 
 
b. London house prices 
It has been estimated that foreign buyers have bought £100bn of London property in the six 
years, between 2008 and 2014 (https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/revealed-how-
foreign-buyers-have-bought-100bn-of-london-property-in-six-years-a3095936.html). That is 
27,989 purchases by companies usually registered in tax havens to hide the buyers’ identities. 
  
 
 
 
According to Land Registry data obtained by Private Eye through freedom of information 
requests, two-thirds of the purchases were made by companies registered in four ‘British’ tax 
havens, Jersey, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and the BVI. The Metropolitan Police also stated in 
2015 that British property purchases worth more than £180m were being investigated as the 
likely proceeds of crime, almost all bought through offshore companies. 
 
It is the purpose of this section to examine the effects in the context of the laundering of large 
amounts of foreign money, particularly from Russia, into the UK and in particular London 
where it is believed a large amount of this money was invested in property.  
 
Table 1 shows London average house prices, disposable income and the number of properties 
purchased by offshore companies over the period. It will be seen that for London as a whole 
whilst house prices have doubled, gross disposable income (‘GDI’) has risen only by around 
50% and that in certain prosperous areas house prices have increased considerably more than 
that which coincides with the large number of offshore companies. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
House prices, gross disposable income (GDI) and properties purchased by offshore 
companies, 2006-2015 
 
House prices Disposable income Offshore companies 
 
2006 
£000 
2015 
£000 
Growth 
% 
2006 
£000 
2015 
£000 
Growth 
% 
2006 
£000 
2015 
£000 
Growth 
% 
London 318.5 627.5 97.0 11,989 18,034 44.7 1,674 3,017 80.2 
Inner London - 
West 
523.5 1,235.4 99.5 13,234 39,386 55.7 1,034 1,552 50.6 
Inner London - 
East 
282.9 546.4 93.1 24,339 19,624 42.6 276 650 135.5 
Outer London - 
East and North 
East 
227.3 357.7 57.3 6,295 8,867 35.5 87 212 143.7 
Outer London - 
South 
266.4 432.0 62.1 7,638 9,839 23.9 64 212 231.2 
Outer London - 
West and North 
West 
312.2 555.2 77.8 8,030 11,614 39.1 213 391 83.6 
Kensington, 
Chelsea, 
Hammersmith 
& Fulham 
663.7 1,565.1 135.8 13,165 20,050 46.5 329 500 52.0 
Westminster 597.3 1,601.9 168.2 32,735 53,061 55.9 509 670 31.6 
City of London 
& Camden 
435.5 1,044.1 139.76 45,305 75,384 60.1 118 254 115.2 
 
Figure 5 shows that whilst the P:GDI ratio is fairly constant over the period for London as a 
whole, it has risen sharply in those districts in which offshore companies are the most 
common, in particular Kensington, Chelsea, Hammersmith & Fulham. Because the data are 
aggregated for these districts, it is not possible to disaggregate them into their component 
parts. This also explains the extremely high average house prices to gross disposable income 
ratio (rising from 50 to almost 80) reflects this disparity of income across the population of 
these districts. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
The ratio of average house to gross disposable income for London as a whole and other 
districts with large numbers of offshore companies for 2006-15. 
 
 
 
The usual guide to expectations regarding house prices is the price to earnings ratio. House 
prices are determined by the ability of buyers to pay, i.e. their disposable income. Whist at 
times house prices increase relative to earnings, this is usually temporary and the price to 
earnings ratio (or price to GDI here, ‘P:GDI ratio’) eventually reverts to its historical mean.  
 
So, by how much would prices have risen had the P:GDI ratio as at 2006 remained constant 
for the rest of the period?xxxi See Table 3 which shows that, whilst London house prices would 
have only increased by 50.42% as a result of increased GDI (mentioned earlier) house price 
rises in the more prosperous areas listed would have been significantly less. This conclusion 
is, of course, based on a number of major assumptions: that the variables remain constant, 
notably that gross disposable income in these areas is unaffected. This may be an unrealistic 
assumption given the inflow of non-nationals into these areas and the impact of house price 
rises on wage demands.  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2 
Estimated house prices if the areas’ price to gross disposable income ratio had remained 
constant as at their 2006 values. 
 
 House prices 2015 
(£000) 
Growth of house 
prices 2006-15 (%) 
 Actual Forecast Actual Forecast 
London as a whole 627,460 479,080 97.01 50.42 
Kensington, Chelsea, Hammersmith & Fulham 1,565,149 1,010,832 135.81 52.30 
City of London & Camden 1,044,130 724,609 139.76 66.39 
Westminster 1,601,893 968,134 168.20 62.09 
 
How does the large number of offshore companies buying properties in some districts affect 
these results? It is hypothesised that in those districts where there is a large number of 
offshore companies, house prices will be higher. This may be measured by estimating a 
regression model of the growth of house prices over the 2006-15 period (the independent 
variable) as a function of (1) the growth of gross disposable income over the same period and 
(2) the number of properties purchased by offshore companies (the independent variables). 
If the hypothesis is supported the coefficients of both independent variables will be 
positive.xxxii See Table 3 in which both independent variables are statistically significant, the 
coefficients are positive and the model’s fit with the data, indicated by the R-Squared statistic, 
is good (Wessa, 2017).  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Table 3 
Regression equation of the growth of house prices over the period 2006-15 as the 
dependent variable and the growth of gross disposable income over the same period and 
the number of new offshore companies as the independent variables. 
 
Variable Average, 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Multiple regression 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error. 
t-stat  1-tail p-
value 
Growth in 
house prices 
85.17   
(31.02) 
    
Growth in  
disposable 
Income 
39.56 
(11.58) 
1.0228 0.3333 3.0683 0.00331 
New 
offshore 
companies 
each year        
1,479 
(2,226) 
0.008878 0.0017 5.1255 0.00003 
Intercept  31.563 12.643 2.4965 0.01124 
R-Squared 0.784211 
F-test 32.707 
Observations 21 
 
How have the use of London property as a haven for corrupt capital and the use of secret 
offshore companies affected property prices in the city? Secret offshore companies may be 
used for purposes not associated with the laundering of corruptly obtained funds. They may 
be used to avoid or evade tax and hide ownership by UK nationals, for example. It is not 
possible, therefore, to ascertain their purpose from publicly available data limited to their 
number and the property location. It follows that it is not possible to ascertain the real 
amount of laundered money ending up in London property. Nevertheless, it is clear from 
these data that London house prices have risen disproportionately during the period and that 
the use of secret offshore companies has contributed to this, both in the areas directly 
concerned and elsewhere where people have been forced to purchase properties in other 
districts and this has cascaded down the property ladder. The result is that all areas have been 
affected although the cascading effect is less as it moves down the property ladder.xxxiii   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Money laundering fines by the FCA, 2002 -19 
 
2002 – Royal Bank of Scotland Plc – 
£750,000 
Weaknesses in controls such as having 
insufficient evidence to verify clients’ identities,  
2003 – Abbey National Plc – £2,320,000 Lax procedures against money laundering 
2003 – Northern Bank – £1,250,000 ‘Inadequate’ safeguards that its customers, 
particularly business customers, really were who 
they claimed to be. 
2004 – Bank of Ireland – £375,000 Failing to detect a series of "suspicious" cash 
transactions totalling nearly £2m. 
2004 – Bank of Scotland – £1,250,000 Failing to keep proper records of customer 
identification 
2004 – Carr Sheppards Crosthwaite 
(stockbrokers) – £500,000 
Failure to have adequate AML systems and 
controls. 
2005 – Investment Services UK Ltd (an 
emerging market bond broker) – 
£175,000 and Managing Director – Ram 
Melwani – £30,000 
Failure to control its business effectively in 
relation to its AML systems. 
2008 – Sindicatum Holdings Ltd £49,000 
and MLRO Michael Wheelhouse – 
£17,500 
Failure to have adequate AML systems and 
controls in place for verifying and recording 
clients’ identities 
2010 – Alpari (UK) Ltd – £140,000 and 
Sudipto Chattopadhyay (MLRO) – 
£14,000 
Failing to have adequate anti-money laundering 
systems and controls. 
2012 – Habib Bank AG Zurich (Habib) – 
£525,000 and MLRO Syed Itrat Hussain – 
£17,500 
Failure to take reasonable care to establish and 
maintain adequate AML systems and controls. 
Approximately 45% of Habib Bank’s customers 
were based outside the UK and about half of its 
deposits came from jurisdictions which, were 
perceived to have higher levels of corruption 
than the UK. 
2012 - Turkish Bank (UK) Ltd - £294,000 Failure to establish and maintain appropriate and 
risk-sensitive AML policies and procedures, carry 
out adequate due diligence and monitoring of its 
customers and maintain adequate records. 
2012 – Coutts – £8.75m Inadequately dealing with clients who were 
’politically exposed persons’ 
2013 – EFG Private Bank Ltd (a global 
private banking group, based in 
Switzerland) – £4,200,000 
Failing to take reasonable care to establish and 
maintain effective AML controls for high risk 
customers 
2013 – Guaranty Trust Bank (UK) Ltd (a 
subsidiary of Nigerian Guaranty Trust 
Bank PLC) – £525,000 
Failings in its AML controls for high risk 
customers based in countries associated with a 
higher risk of money laundering, bribery or 
corruption, including accounts held by PEPs. 
  
 
 
 
 
2014 – Standard Bank PLC – £7,640,400 
Failings relating to its AML policies and 
procedures over corporate customers connected 
to PEPs. 
2015 – Bank of Beirut (UK) Ltd. – £2.1m, 
Anthony Wills (former compliance 
officer), and Michael Allin (internal 
auditor), £19,600 and £9,900, 
respectively 
Repeatedly providing the regulator with 
misleading information after it was required to 
address concerns regarding its financial crime 
systems and controls. 
2015 – Barclays Bank– £72m The failings relate to a £1.88bn transaction 
arranged for a number of ultra-high net worth 
clients who were PEPs  
2017 - Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche 
Bank) £163,076,224 
Failing to maintain an adequate AML control 
framework. See text. 
2018 - Canara Bank £896,100 Failing to maintain adequate AML systems and 
failing to take sufficient steps to remedy 
identified weaknesses. 
2019 - Standard Chartered Bank £102.2m Failings relating to its AML policies and 
procedures over corporate customers connected 
to PEPs. 
 
Source: http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/enforcement/fines 
 
5. Regulation 
The 2007 Regulations require all businesses to be supervised by an appropriate Anti-Money-
Laundering (AML) supervisory authority. Table 4 lists the fines imposed by the FCA on financial 
intermediaries.  Others involved in the movement of ‘liquid assets’ such as, lawyers, jewellers, 
casinos, accountants and tax advisers, estate agents and other property transaction 
professionals are not but instead by their own regulatory authorities. 
 
The UK Gambling Commission handles the regulation of AML obligations of bookmakers, 
casinos and online gambling organisations. In November 2018 the Commission announced it 
had fined various online betting firms a total of ₤14m for failing to prevent money laundering 
and effectively protect problem gamblers. In May 2019 it announced it had fined four more. 
These are listed in Table 5. It also announced that various other operators had been issued 
with Advice to Conduct letters and there were others under investigation. Also, since the 
investigation began, five companies, including CZ Holdings, have surrendered their UK betting 
licences. 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Table 5 
Money laundering fines by the UK Gambling Commission, 2015-2019 
 
2018 - CZ Holdings Ltd Breached conditions of its licence relating to AML 
and failed to comply with social responsibility 
codes of practice, subsequently surrendered its 
licence 
2018 - William Hill, bookmaker Fined £6.2m for breaching AML and social 
responsibility regulations. William Hill gained 
£1.2m by failing to prevent 10 customers from 
depositing large sums linked to criminal offences. 
2018 - Daub Alderney, an online 
gambling company 
Fined £7.1m for failing to follow Gambling 
Commission rules aimed at preventing money 
laundering and protecting vulnerable consumer. 
2018 - Casumo, an online gambling 
company 
Fined £5.85m for shortfalls in its social 
responsibility and AML procedures. 
2018 - Videoslots, an online gambling 
company 
Fined £1m regulatory settlement 
20018 - 32Red, an online gambling 
company 
Fined £2m for failing to protect a consumer and 
for money laundering failures. This involved a 
customer being allowed to deposit £758,000 on 
the site without money laundering or social 
responsibility checks.  
2019 - InTouch Games, an online 
gambling company 
Fined £2.2m for failing to prevent money 
laundering and keep consumers safe from harm. 
2019 - Betit Operations Limited Fined £1.4m for failing to prevent money 
laundering and keep consumers safe from harm. 
2019 - MT Secure Trade Fined £700,000 for failing to prevent money 
laundering and keep consumers safe from harm. 
2019 - BestBet Fined £230,972 for failing to prevent money 
laundering and keep consumers safe from harm. 
2019 – Platinum Gaming Ltd Fined £1.6m for failing to identify gambling harm and 
prevent money laundering 
2019 – Gamesys Ltd Fined £1.2m for failing to prevent gambling harm 
and breaching money laundering regulations 
2019 – Ladbroke Coral Group Fined £5.9m for failing to put in place effective 
safeguards to prevent consumers suffering gambling 
harm and against money laundering 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Table 6 
Solicitors fined by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal for money laundering offences 
 
2017 - Stephen Grimes and 
Frederick Broadbridge  
Fined £35,000 for multiple accounts rule breaches  
2017 - Clyde & Co Fined £50,000 and three of its partners fined £10,000 
following a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ruling that they 
breached money laundering and accountancy rule 
2019 - Khalid Mohammed Sharif, 
a partner at Child & Child 
Fined £45,000 for failing to conduct anti-money laundering 
checks for wealthy clients believed to be linked to the 
Panama Papers scandal. 
2018 - Amit Kumar Manibhai 
Patel a partner at Manis 
Fined £12,500 by SDT for recklessly exposed his firm to the 
risk of money laundering. 
 
The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal handles complaints of misconduct by solicitors including 
investigating money laundering offences. Recently published cases are listed in Table 6. The 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies (‘CCAB’) handles the regulation of AML 
obligations of the provision of auditing, accountancy, tax advisory, insolvency and related 
services. N. Bevan Ltd is the only one reported (https://www.rossmartin.co.uk/sme-tax-
news/2358-hmrc-fine-for-anti-money-laundering-failures). It is ironic that small accountancy 
firm has been fined for probably a minor AML offence when the large firms are allegedly 
involved in advisory work. 
 
 
Table 7 
Companies fined for money laundering offences under the Money Laundering, Terrorist 
Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 during the 
period 2018-19* 
 
Jewellers 3 
Accountancy and taxation services 4 
Financial intermediary 1 
Estate agents 3 
Business support 2 
Second-hand car sales 1 
Investment company 1 
                               Total number 15 
                               Total fines £293,330 
                               Average fine £19,555 
 
  
 
 
 
* Source: http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/businesses-not-complying-with-
money-laundering-regulations-in-2018-to-2019/current-list-of-businesses-that-have-not-
complied-with-the-2017-money-laundering-regulation 
 
Under the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the 
Payer) Regulations 2017 details are published of businesses that do not comply with AML  
regulations. These are summarised in Table 7. The average size of fines has increased 
considerably over recent years (£1,310 in 2016/17, £3,450 in 2017/18).  
 
Estate agents are particularly susceptible to money laundering. The sector is predominantly 
unregulated and therefore vulnerable to criminal activity. Criminals look to launder money 
through properties not just high-end London properties but also university towns where 
foreign investment companies may hide their money. A number of estate agents have been 
fined under the 2017 regulations for failing to do anti-money-laundering checks on both the 
buyers and sellers of properties.  Countrywide was fined 215,000, Tepilo Ltd £68,595, Settled 
Ltd £3,245, Sheridans Ltd £3,553 and Vail Williams LLP £3,461.  
 
6. Recent initiatives and what could and should be done 
The main response in the UK to the problem that the real owners of companies registered in 
the UK are not known or disguised has been the revision and extension of information 
required to be provided to the Companies Registration Office (usually referred to as 
Companies House) and the Land Registry (LR). All UK companies must now maintain a public 
register listing ‘persons with significant control’ (PCS) ion line with the EU’s 4th Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive to set up registers of the ultimate beneficial owners (UBOs) of legal 
entities.  
 
 The contents of a company’s Annual Return have been revised and the document has been 
renamed a Confirmation Statement and includes what is referred to as the PCS section. There 
are other significant promised developments, largely as a result of the 2016 Anti-Corruption 
Summit.xxxiv The Register of Beneficial Ownership of Property at the LR is to be publicly 
available in 2021. This will require overseas companies that own or purchase UK property (or 
  
 
 
 
bids on government procurement contracts) to enter details of beneficial ownership of UK 
property on the register. Public registers showing the beneficial ownership of companies 
registered in some Crown Dependencies are to be available from 2023 for Jersey, Guernsey 
and the Isle of Man. Pressure has been applied to other dependencies to also publish registers 
such as Bermuda.xxxv 
  
Whilst these developments were praised and seen as a breakthrough, elsewhere they have 
been seen with scepticism and, certainly, the momentum and political push at the time of the 
Anti-Corruption Summit have gone.  Nevertheless, there are a number of areas in which AMR 
need to be improved. The first relates to the use of limited companies, or to be more precise, 
shell companies. It is often said by commentators that the secrecy available to shell 
companies could easily be removedxxxvi  Whilst the filing of company data at Companies House 
is a mandatory requirement, it acts merely as a depository. Data are not checked for factual 
accuracy. In fact, there are no checks on data at all other than Companies House’s duty of 
care and its power to impose fines and instigate criminal proceedings for providing incorrect 
data.xxxvii  
 
This situation is made worse by the loss of the protection provided by audit and significantly 
undermines the reliability of financial and related information submitted to Companies House 
and provides huge scope for fraudsters. Until 2006 all limited companies’ accounts were 
required to be audited. Auditors are required to check and verify data and report on unlawful 
acts by the company and its officers. They also have an obligation to report suspected money 
laundering.xxxviii However, under the Companies Act 2006, Section 479, small companies (and 
therefore shell companies) are no longer required to be audited. The AML legislation imposes 
a duty to report money laundering in respect of all criminal property.xxxix Not only are the 
owners of a shell company able to avoid these checks, they are free to misrepresent and 
manipulate reported transactions that auditors are very likely to discover, e.g. fictitious 
receipts and payments mentioned in 3(6) above.  
 
In my view, Section 479 should be repealed in respect of shell companies.xl Parliament should 
also require Companies House to raise the standards concerning the accuracy and reliability 
  
 
 
 
of the register. Companies incorporated in the UK are allowed to play an important role in 
money laundering and tax evasion because their owners are free to lie in the documents they 
are required to submit and avoid scrutiny. It is ironic that while banking regulations require 
in-depth documentation and identification for individuals, it is much easier for companies 
(with the help of their lawyers) to hide their transactions and the identity of their owners, 
simply being required to report their business location, company and tax numbers.xli  
 
The second area in which AMR may be improved concerns the ability of off-shore companies 
to purchase UK properties without disclosing their UBOs. The Land Registration Act of 2002 
should be changed to deter purchases of UK residential property by UK and off-shore shell 
companies. It should require all transaction prices to be recorded in the LR. The LR should also 
be required to receive and maintain records of all properties held by UK and off-shore 
companies and the evidence of the price paid for these properties. PoCA should be changed 
to facilitate confiscation of all properties registered in UK and off-shore shell companies if 
their owners (UBOs) are shown to have been engaged in money laundering or tax evasion. 
Further, businesses and intermediaries without HMRC registration for real estate operations 
should be prohibited from acting on behalf of customers, facilitating or assisting in their 
property deals.xlii Parliament should require the UK National Crime Agency to conduct a 
review of all off- shore shell companies that were established in tax havens and now own UK 
properties. Further, the owners of these entities should be investigated for money laundering 
and tax evasion where appropriate. 
 
Thirdly, there needs to be a radical overhaul of the UK’s AML supervisory regime. The current 
arrangement, held together by a patchwork of 25 different oversight bodies with varying 
powers and responsibilities, is simply not working. There should be fewer supervisory bodies 
overseeing firms’ compliance with the rules, with sufficient resourcing to carry out their 
duties, free from conflicts of interest, and a more targeted approach to how they work. For 
instance, in the area of company formation and maintenance services, there are 19 bodies 
responsible for ensuring compliance (e.g. ICAEW) many of whom are also the lobbyists for 
their regulated community. The Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering 
Supervisors (OPBAS) has made the point that some of these self-regulatory bodies have 
  
 
 
 
expressed concerns that issuing robust fines would ‘damage their ability to attract or retain 
members’.xliii 
 
To sum up, money laundering, together with the associated use of shell companies for tax 
avoidance and evasion, must be one of the most regressive economic phenomena whereby 
the rich and corrupt are able to avoid financial regulations and tax whilst the less wealthy and 
honest are not. It is little more than simple theft and this goes unchecked. It has been shown 
here that whilst this is recognised by politicians and regulators, UK legislation has merely 
responded but only to the extent of requiring more information to be reported. As yet, no 
large-scale investigations have been launched, even though London has become a favourite 
city for money launderers. It has also been shown here that the economic and social effects 
on the UK as the receiver of laundered money and Russia as the provider are considerable: 
causing property prices in London to escalate in comparison to people’s earnings and in 
Moscow an exodus of the rich and corrupt. This situation contrasts with elsewhere in Europe, 
where in certain instances a more radical approach has been adopted. It has been shown how 
in Spain, criminal investigations and prosecutions were launched at enormous expense but 
could be justified by the additional taxes and fines they generated - plus, of course, the 
preventative effects. At the time of writing, the involvement in Deutsche Bank in money 
laundering is still being investigated and the outcome of investigations at HSBC are not 
reportedxliv UK regulators should be required by Parliament to enforce AML laws and 
regulations and, where necessary, impose heavier fines and jail terms for violators.  
  
  
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Barnes, P.  (1986) ‘What value investor protection?’, Accountancy, July, p.19. 
Caesar, E.  (2017a) ‘Deutsche Bank’s $10-Billion Scandal’, The New Yorker.  18 Jan. Available 
at: https://www.newyorker.com/contributors/ed-caesar 
Caesar, E. (2017b) ‘A Big Fine, And New Questions, On Deutsche Bank’s “Mirror Trades”’. 
Available at: The New Yorker,22 Feb. https://www.newyorker.com/contributors/ed-caesar 
Chan, M. (2017) ‘Case Study: Deutsche Bank Money Laundering Scheme’, Seven Pillars 
Institute Available at: https://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-study-deutsche-bank-money-
laundering-scheme 
HM Treasury and Home office (2015) UK national risk assessment of money laundering and 
terrorist financing, available at www.gov.uk/government/publications. 
Hubbs, R. (2014) ‘Shell games: Investigating shell companies and understanding their roles in 
international fraud’, Fraud Magazine, July/August 1-6. 
New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS) (2017) ‘DFS fines Deutsche Bank $425 
million for Russian mirror-trading scheme. 25 Jan. 2017. Available at: 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1701301.htm 
Pacini, C., W. Hopwood, G. Young and J. Crain (2019) ‘The role of shell entities in fraud and 
other financial crimes’, Managerial Auditing Journal, 34(3): 247-267. 
Salomatin,K. (2015) ‘Moscow’s poshest neighbourhood is shockingly empty as money pours 
out of Russia’, available at https://www.businessinsider.com/rublyovka-the-richest-
neighborhood-in-moscow-2015-6?r=US&IR=T. 
Saperstein, L., G. Sant and M. Ng (2015) ’The Failure of Anti-Money Laundering Regulation: 
Where is the Cost-Benefit Analysis?’, Notre Dame Law Rev. Online 91(1). Available at: 
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlronline/vol91/iss1/4 
Szubin, A. (2016) ‘A dangerous shell game’, The Hill, 7 November. Available at  
https://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/287291-a-dangerous-shell-game 
Transparency International (‘TI’) (2015) Corruption on your doorstep: How corrupt capital is 
used to buy property in the UK, London, TI. 
Unger, B. (2007) The scale and impacts of money laundering Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. 
Yiolitis, E., P. Graham and S. Hudd (2014) ‘Russian Federation: Guide to the Russian 
deoffshorization law’, Mondaq.com, 15 December. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
i See for example https://www.theweek.co.uk/97000/europe-s-biggest-banks-fined-for-money-
laundering. 
ii The website https://listverse.com/2016/01/29/10-ways-to-move-money-like-a-crime-boss/  also 
lists ten of the most popular methods. 
iii The UK "tax gap" is the difference between the amount of tax that should, in theory, be collected 
by the tax collection agency HMRC, against what is actually collected. The tax gap for the UK in 
2016/17 was £35bn, or 5.6% of theoretical total tax liabilities. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
iv For example, the FCA’s S166 investigation into HSBC’s AML controls reported in 2017. It is unclear 
whether this was for the Russian Laundromat or other cases as the outcome of the investigation at 
the time of writing (March 2020) has not been reported, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/02/21/hsbc-profits-slump-volatile-year/  
v Since 2001, the US Treasury Department has used Section 311 to go after the banks and front 
companies that help North Korea evade sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program and terrorism financing, 
to isolate Syria, to punish banks that helped Saddam Hussein launder money, and to pressure off-
shore havens, such as the Pacific island of Nauru, that the US believes are complicit in money 
laundering. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1056.aspx. 
vi See for example https://euobserver.com/justice/145370. 
vii See for example https://www.worcesternews.co.uk/news/17737045.courier-fraud-money-
laundering-trial-two-men-are-jailed/ 
viii Senators John Kerry and  Hank Brown ‘The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations’, p.60 available at: www.lulu.com/shop/senator-john-kerry-and-senator-hank-brown/the-
bcci-affair-a-report-to-the-committee-on-foreign-relations/paperback/product-17359009.html. 
ix See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/money-sender-fined-record-78-million-in-money-
laundering-crackdown 
x In the 1980s, a small Stoke on Trent charity, the T.C. Vincent Foundation, was discovered to have 
been used to launder millions of pounds for ex-President Ferdinand Marcos and dubious financiers. 
The trust began as a fund-raising charity for women with legal problems. However, without its 
knowledge, it became involved with individuals who wished to sanitise cash and gold. By handing 
cash to the charity on short-term loans, launderers would later ask for their money back from the 
Foundation’s bank account in the Isle of Man (Barnes, 1986).  
xi See for example https://www.blockchain-council.org/blockchain/how-bitcoin-money-laundering-
works/ 
xii https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/blackpeso.html. 
xiii Hawala is an informal banking system originating in ancient India. The word means ‘money 
transfer without moving money’. The system consists of thousands of brokers, or hawaladars 
throughout the globe each keeping detailed ledgers of transactions that largely relies on an honour 
to enforce (https://marketbusinessnews.com/financial-glossary/hawala-definition-meaning). 
xiv See for example, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/criminal-activities/common-money-
laundering-scams/ 
xv See for example the case of Millfield School, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/top-private-schools-unwittingly-accepting-
laundered-money-wealthy-foreign-criminals-moldovan-police-a7640811.html. 
xvi http://www.internetgamblingguide.net/process-money-laundering.html 
 
  
 
 
 
 
xvii See for example https://www.casino.org/blog/money-laundering-in-online-casinos/ 
xviii See for example https://www.theargus.co.uk/news/17714338.horse-racing-betting-scam-
brighton-fraudsters-must-pay-thousands/ 
xix This may not be necessarily expensive and if done correctly may actually be profitable. See: 
https://www.beatingbetting.co.uk/matched-betting-tips/arbitrage-betting/. 
xx See: 
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/687804/Money+Laundering/Money+Laundering+And+The+Gamblin
g+Industry. 
xxi For an excellent illustration see https://www.buzzfeed.com/janebradley/shell-companies-money-
laundering-uk-paul-manafort 
xxii Pacini et al (2019) identify ten types of shell entities and other legal structures and devices used 
to achieve secrecy. 
xxiii See for example, https://www.accla.im/corporate-services/ in respect of the Isle of Man. For an 
explanation and illustration of how the BVI  nominee system works see 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/offshore/how-nominee-trick-done/.  
xxiv https://www.newsweek.com/london-house-center-manafort-indictment-701064. For examples 
outside the UK, see Hubbs (2014) of cases in which thousands of privately-owned shell companies 
are registered at the same address. His ‘hotspots’ include 103 Sham Peng Tong Plaza" in Victoria, 
Seychelles and PO Box 3444 Road Town, Tortola, BVI.  
xxv https://www.transparency.org.uk/formations-house-29leaks-uk-company-formation-agent-anti-
money-laundering/ 
xxvi http://www.typicallyspanish.com/news- 
spain/mallorca/The_Supreme_Court_has_condemned_the_lawyer_Alejandro_Feliu_for_money_lau
ndering.shtml. Bradley bought a villa in Calvia in 2004 through his company, Bell Brogit SL, avoiding 
€1,478,166 tax. 
xxvii https://www.thinkspain.com/news-spain/8399/british-man-jailed-in-money-laundering-
investigation. 
xxviii https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-
papers/#_ga=2.238795782.785521287.1562861423-761674366.1562861423 
xxix https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/thomasfrank/secret-money-how-trump-made-millions-
selling-condos-to#.pdnbw6aVwR 
xxx Mirror trading is not unlawful per se. Here, it is the purpose for which it is used that is unlawful. It 
was developed as a forex trading method in which a trader chooses a successful trading strategy and 
copies it in real time. 
xxxi It would be possible to calculate the effect of offshore companies in the regression model (i.e. 
setting their number at zero) as the independent variables are statistically uncorrelated. However, 
this has not been reported as such a scenario is unrealistic. 
xxxii It would be possible to estimate the same model or variations on it in many ways and over other 
data, e.g. cross-sectionally across all districts for a year or, longitudinally, across all years for a 
district. 
xxxiii It should be possible to estimate this drift econometrically by means of lagging the dependent 
variables but this has not been done as the results clear and the timing involved in lagged variables is 
subjective. 
xxxiv This was hosted by the UK Government and six countries, the UK, Afghanistan, Kenya, France, 
the Netherlands and Nigeria, agreed to publish registers of the real owners of companies in their 
territories, a ‘register of beneficial ownership’. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2016/may/12/david-cameron-london-anti-corruption-
summit-live. 
xxxv http://www.royalgazette.com/international-business/article/20190625/crown-dependencies-to-
make-registers-public 
  
 
 
 
 
xxxvi For instance, Szubin (2016) in the US says ’Congress could close this loophole by passing a simple, 
two-page law requiring the beneficial owner of a company to be identified whenever a U.S. company 
is formed’. 
xxxvii There are many stories of ridiculous numbers being entered on the records such as dates where 
monetary values should appear and of individuals unknown to them being listed as shareholders or 
directors. For example, in the footnote xv above citing a report in Buzzfeed, some of the companies’ 
accounts referred to list annual income as the year the accounts were due: £2,015 for 2015, £2,016 
for 2016.  
xxxviii PoCA deﬁnes both the money laundering offences and the auditor’s reporting responsibilities. 
xxxix https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/b66f7fb6-7ada-4f9d-9946-e06198224774/PN-12-
(Revised)-Money-laundering-Guidance-Sept-2010.pdf. 
xl It may be difficult to distinguish between shell companies devised to hold property for purposes 
potentially related to money laundering and genuine small businesses. Owning property above a 
certain value could be a criterion. 
xli Jean Eaglesham, Mark Maremont, and Lisa Schwartz gave an example in  the Wall Street Journal: 
‘Donald Trump owns a helicopter in Scotland. To be more precise, he has a revocable trust that 
owns 99 percent of a Delaware limited liability company that owns 99 percent of another Delaware 
LLC that owns a Scottish limited company that owns another Scottish company that owns the 26-
year-old Sikorsky S-76B helicopter, emblazoned with a red ‘TRUMP’ on the side of its fuselage.’ In 
total, 15 entities were used at that point to ‘own’ Trump’s fleet of two airplanes and three 
helicopters. 
xlii Committee for Legislation Against Money Laundering in Properties by Kleptocrats, 
http://clampk.org/ 
xliii https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/opbas/themes-2018-opbas-anti-money-laundering-
supervisory-assessments.pdf. 
xliv Also see Endnote iii above. 
